Abstract
Introduction
Both the Defense Department and private industry aggressively criticize the current state of contract pricing, cost reimbursement contracting regulation, and contract profit policy. Detractors assert that the statutory and regulatory regime poses significant impediments to civil/military integration (CMI).
i Critics assert that intrusive, i DoD recently ranked numerous cost drivers, originally identify by a Coopers & Lybrand/TASC study, in terms of their priority to CMI. Category 1 barriers (the highest priority) included the Truth in Negotiations Act, Cost Accounting Standards, Contract Cost Principles, and Contract burdensome, government-unique requirements provide barriers to entry by commercial firms.
While debate continues regarding the true impact of these barriers, most participants and observers agree that impediments derive from the cost and complexities that burden government-unique requirements associated with: (1) the disclosure of cost or pricing information pursuant to the Truth In Negotiations Act (TINA),
ii (2) accounting allocation rules primarily associated with the Cost Accounting Standards (CAS), iii and (3) the allowability of certain incurred costs, addressed in the regulatory cost principles.
iv Superimposed upon this framework is a legitimate concern regarding the use of criminal and civil anti-fraud measures, primarily through the 1986 amendments to the False Claims Act (FCA), v to scrutinize deviations from these complex cost, pricing, and profit policies and controls.
Viewed from afar, the existing maze of statutes and regulations that affect contract pricing seem unduly complex, burdensome, and, in the case of potential sanctions, risky, Administration and Reporting. See, e.g., DoD Ranks Cost Drivers' Impact on Civil-Military Integration, 40 GOV'T CONTRACTOR ¶ 550 (December 9, 1998) . given their intended purpose. Arguably, these various mechanisms serve merely to ensure that contractors do not make "too much" profit on government contracts. There must be a better way.
For the purposes of this paper, we do not attempt to distinguish "excessive" profits from those deemed "exploitative." The adjectives are neither meaningful nor relevant. As discussed below, Congress has repeatedly demonstrated its ability to set broad, sweeping, seemingly arbitrary, percentage-based limits on contractor profits. In this paper, we do not seek to add to such an effort.
Nor do we advocate for profit controls generally. Rather, we begin from the assumption that the community -whether Congress, the procuring agencies, the media, or the public -will not tolerate, conceptually, contractors reaping excessive profits for government work. Faced with that reality, we propose a streamlined, equitable system to effectuate this policy.
In this brief paper, we assert that the Government, for better or worse, is incapable of tolerating excessive contractor profits. We suggest that our current unduly complex, burdensome, and risk-laden system ineffectively endeavors to limit excessive profits. We re-visit the Renegotiation Act, extinct for more than twenty years, and find it less troubling than the existing quagmire. Finally, we make a modest proposal to simplify and decriminalize pricing and profit policy and practice that draws from the renegotiation experience. Stat. 1926 (June 25, 1936 53 Stat. 555, 560, 590 (April 3, 24, 25, 1939); 54 Stat. 676, 677 (June 28, 1940 This sentiment is neither confined to wartime exigency, nor is it consistent with capitalistic notions of the role of profit in markets.
Government Fixation With Avoiding
When DoD introduced its "weighted guidelines," now more than thirty years ago, it touted profit as the engine that drives Steel Corp., 315 U.S. 289, 308-309 (1942) . See generally, James F. Nagle, A HISTORY OF GOVERNMENT CONTRACTING, 350-353, 439-442 (1992 xvii Yet, only the naive could believe that Congress or the public will be any more tolerant of profits deemed excessive simply because they were reaped by "commercial" firms or derived from "commercial item" purchases. Whether due to an irrational obsession with avoidance of excess profits or a wellintentioned effort to ensure that the Government obtains the best value for its procurement dollar, the result has been the same. Our current procurement system imposes significant barriers to entry to commercial firms. Although these barriers may differ based upon the type of contractual vehicle employed --for example the use of cost-based versus fixed-price contracts --the symptoms are similar: complex, resource intensive compliance requirements with corresponding risks.
Complexity and Criminalization

Cost-Based Contracting; Neither Poison Nor Panacea
Cost reimbursement contracting arguably reduces the risks contractors must assume when uncertainties in contract performance do not permit costs to be estimated with sufficient accuracy to use any type of fixed-price contract. These contractual vehicles obligate the Government to reimburse contractors for their allowable incurred costs, typically within a stipulated ceiling.
xviii Recent acquisition reform effort and energy, however, have focused upon reducing the use of cost-based contracting. Further, the infrastructure required to administer and comply with the regulatory requirements associated with cost-based contracting absorb a significant portion of the Government's investment in these contracts.
Nonetheless, it appears unlikely that the end of cost-based contracting is near. Elimination of this contracting option seems impracticable absent a sufficient alternative to insulate contractors from assuming excessive financial risk on large, development projects that, for example, seek to expand the state of the art. Further, wholesale change "will require a cultural change of immense proportions and a major cleanup of the FAR" regulatory scheme.
xxi Nonetheless, it appears reasonable to expect the pendulum to continue to swing towards a preference for fixed-price vehicles. In either event, energy must be devoted to reducing the administrative and compliance burdens associated with either type of pricing mechanism.
Fixed-Price Contracts in Theory and Practice
Fixed-price contracts (FFP) commit the supplier to perform the contract at a specific price, regardless of actual performance costs. The FAR describes the incentive features of FFP contracts as placing:upon the contractor the maximum risk and full responsibility for all costs and resulting profit or loss. It provides maximum incentive for the contractor to control costs and perform effectively and imposes a minimum background on the Truman Committee, see James F. Nagle, A HISTORY OF GOVERNMENT CONTRACTING, 423-25, 440-441 (1992 The contractor thus absorbs all overruns and, conversely, retains all amounts by which actual performance costs underrun the contract price.
FFP contracts maximize incentives to control costs only if the contracting parties believe that renegotiation of the contract price is allowed only when (1) renegotiation is contemplated by the express terms of the original agreement and takes place pursuant to a mechanism specified in the agreement; or (2) contingencies during performance satisfy the strict requirements of contract law doctrines governing impossibility and unforseeability.
xxiii Efforts to renegotiate terms outside these circumstances can weaken incentives to comply with the original contract terms in any one procurement episode; diminish the willingness of firms to contract with entities that have a reputation for attempting to reopen the original terms; or induce the parties to take costly precautions to account for the possibility that renegotiation will occur.
The Truth In Negotiations Act: A Microcosm Reflecting The Larger Problem
If the current compliance regime derives from the Government's efforts to avoid paying excess profits, TINA could not be more inefficient. If the Government truly desires to procure based upon best value, the information obtained during the negotiation process must be deemed irrelevant. Further, while only the successful offeror must certify its cost or pricing data, all offerors prepare the data as part of the proposal preparation process.
The Content and Purpose of the Truth in Negotiations Act
TINA stemmed from Congressional concerns that suppliers with sole-source contracts will negotiate excessive fixed prices with DOD because the lack of rivalry for the contracts at issue prevents market forces from exerting sufficient discipline over costs. TINA often applies to long-term production contracts for weapon systems, where DOD annually negotiates purchases with a sole supplier.
TINA compels contractors in negotiated procurements to reveal accurate, current, and complete "cost or pricing" data up to the time that the parties agree on the contract price. Cost or pricing data consists of all facts that "a prudent buyer or seller would reasonably expect to affect price negotiations significantly." xxiv The contractor need not supply information that is "judgmental" but must reveal all facts on which its judgments rest.
xxv TINA does not apply to acquisitions Contractors typically must certify that they have made the required disclosures. Price increases attributable to a failure to make the requisite disclosures constitute "defective pricing" and entitle DOD to recapture each dollar of overcharges caused by a nondisclosure.
xxviii Inaccurate certifications also can trigger or elicit formidable civil and criminal sanctions where the inaccurate certification contained a deliberate misrepresentation or displayed a reckless disregard for the truth.
xxix DOD uses extensive ex ante and ex post auditing tools to costs or projections, they do include the data forming the basis for that judgment. HANDBOOK (2d ed. 1991 & 1996 . determine whether the contractor has provided data subject to disclosure.
The likelihood that an audit can discover a TINA violation for any single contract is substantial, particularly for major weapons programs. In the period leading to an agreement on price, weapon suppliers daily generate large volumes of relevant information from internal sources and from external vendors. Exhaustive, expensive, post-negotiation "sweeps," intended to verify all conceivable data points, rarely prove foolproof. Items of cost or pricing data that are not supplied to DOD's negotiation team violate the disclosure requirement. The preparation and negotiation of pricing proposals provide many events that may constitute technical violations of the disclosure requirements.
The Truth in Negotiations Act as a Renegotiation Mechanism
A contractor's main incentive to commit itself to a fixed-price contract is the opportunity to keep amounts by which its costs underrun the contract price. Wellconceived price levels incorporate productivity improvement assumptions that allow DOD to benefit from productivity gains but still give the contractor strong incentives to achieve cost reductions that depress its actual costs below the fixed price. If the supplier greatly reduces its costs for any single contract, it will realize substantial profits for that contract.
DOD can react to these profits in two ways. The first is to treat a discrete period of high profits as unremarkable. High profits may result simply from superior performance, including efforts to improve productivity.
The second reaction is to regard a period of high profits as proof that the contractor manipulated the establishment of the fixed price. (This assumes, unfortunately and incorrectly, that generous contractor profits somehow must be inconsistent with the Government obtaining best value.) If it accepts the second hypothesis, DOD might dramatically adjust the fixed price downward in future contract periods or renegotiate ex post to capture some of the returns from cost reduction in the initial contract period.
TINA induces contractors to reveal private information about anticipated costs. TINA's efficiency effects depend heavily on what the auditors regard as adequate information disclosures and how DOD responds to insufficient disclosures. One possible response is to treat high profits as proof that the contractor has failed to make mandated pre-contractual disclosures. High profits on individual contracts could trigger careful ex post audits of contractor data to determine whether the firm withheld information that, if disclosed during precontractual negotiations, would have led DOD to insist on a lower fixed price.
In practice, perceived contractor failures to make required disclosures usually result in efforts to recover the amount by which the contractor overstated its costs. Most annual production contracts for major weapon systems undergo extensive ex post audits to determine whether disclosures mandated by TINA were adequate. Since the early 1980s, the government has resorted increasingly to civil and criminal investigations premised on the view that nondisclosure was deliberate and done to defraud the government.
Price-ceiling regimes that enable regulators to recapture all or part of amounts by which the firm's earned rate of return exceeds a specific norm are not unique to government procurement. What distinguishes defense contracting are two features of the enforcement mechanism. First, DOD can threaten to commence a civil or criminal fraud inquiry to recapture excess returns. Second, the Civil False Claims Act empowers a contractor's employees to challenge apparent violations of the law. xxx DOD audits unquestionably uncover some instances of willful contractor efforts to conceal data subject to disclosure duties. Yet DOD's use of TINA sometimes seems to support the hypothesis that the Government is renegotiating original contract terms and is seeking to obtain ex post a more favorable disposition of the surplus generated by contractor cost-cutting.
The certainty of probing, ex post analysis of actual cost experience could influence contractors in several ways. First, it could induce limit pricing by which firms forego efforts in any single negotiation to get the highest fixed price possible. Weapons programs often are repeat games consisting of a series of one-year contracts.
xxxi Firms may realize that high returns in one year may provoke ex post sanctions or lead DOD to impose severe price ceilings in future years. ECON. 126 (1993) .
Second, the prospect of renegotiation may diminish contractor efforts to cut costs in any one period, as cost reduction that boosts the return on the contract to levels unacceptable to DOD is likely to elicit unfavorable scrutiny. Firms may reduce efforts to achieve dramatic productivity gains or may be more inclined to tolerate expenditures that needlessly increase costs and reduce the overall return on the contract to levels DOD deems appropriate. Such caution would tend to impede bold efforts to cut costs and otherwise improve productivity.
Third, the possibility that the Government might seek criminal sanctions against the firm and individual employees can result in costly investments in administrative safeguards to ensure that even inadvertent nondisclosures of information do not occur. Suppliers also may delay the negotiation process to determine that strict compliance with TINA has been achieved before an agreement on price is reached.
Barring Congressional repeal of TINA --an unlikely occurrence --what alternatives are available to permit the Government to insulate itself from excessive profit, while reducing the administrative burdens and risks of criminal sanctions that pose formidable barriers to entry into the Federal procurement marketplace? Perhaps history provides a useful analogy.
